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Abstract: The question “what does a woman want?” has been asked by 
psychoanalysts in the past—particularly by Freud and Lacan—and is a question 
that has been taken up by feminist scholarship and epistemology. This essay 
addresses this complex question via both feminist research and enquiry and a 
Lacanian psychoanalytic praxis. The issue of women’s very speech is crucial, 
which is a cornerstone element of the feminisms of Spender, Steinem, Hanisch, 
Irigaray, Cixous, Felski, Jane and Ford. Lacan makes the point that feminine 
jouissance stands outside the phallic order and thus must be incorporated in 
the psychoanalytic consideration of what is the sexed position, woman. This 
essay argues that Lacan’s psychoanalytic considerations have great political and 
practical import for contemporary feminist practices and epistemology, via the 
positioning of women’s very speech outside of—but apposite to—a provably 
violent misogynistic patriarchy.
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Kindly don’t grab my pussy; she has teeth 
Lacan once famously begged:
The plausibility of what I am claiming here—namely, that woman 
knows nothing of this jouissance—is underscored by the fact that in 
all the time people have been begging them, begging them on their 
hands and knees—I spoke last time of women psychoanalysts—to try 
and tell us, not a word! We’ve never been able to get anything out of 
them (Lacan 1973c 75).
Well, listen up now, I am going to tell you.
 In May of last year—the infamous 2016—I had the privilege to go with my 
teenage trans-child to listen to Gloria Steinem speak in the Melbourne Town 
Hall (Steinem 2016). Steinem, who is of course a feminist foremother to me, 
articulated something that needs to be worked through, and which has been 
fomenting within my own feminist praxis now for a long time. 
 It was audience question time, and a woman from a youth feminist 
collective was invited to ask a question. Her question was: “Despite all of our 
progress so far, what has gone wrong with feminism today?”
 Steinem’s response was this: “We’ve been too nice.”
 I could not self-censor, perhaps I’m so old I don’t care to anymore. I 
stood up, whooped, clapped, jumped up and down and got maybe a few other 
(shocked) people responding as well. (The woman sitting next to me was not 
very impressed by my wild joy.)
 My response game from the glee of a very sharp and public enunciation 
of something that has been at the heart of my own feminist investigation and 
praxis: the “difficulty” with woman’s real voice, woman’s unconscious words. 
 I noted that there was a brief silence, something of a shock for the 
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audience to have heard what Steinem just said. No-one knew how to respond—
or at least, no-one seemed to respond as much from the unconscious as I did. 
This hesitance, the silence, and inability to respond to Steinem’s words bothered 
me. The very signifier of “being nice” was touched, tainted perhaps, by what 
Steinem had just said. Was it too oppositional, too defiant, too raw?
 This hesitation of the audience to react to these very words, indicated 
to me that there is still something rotten in the state of the way women are 
“allowed” to speak, still something that our foremothers have started that has 
not yet been processed by us, feminists and all. Steinem had just said something 
that to many in the audience seemed “radical”, “impolite”. 
 There is still something in the very way that women speak that is perceived 
as dangerous as there ever was, despite the many years of feminist theoretical 
research, and practice. There is still a problem with what a woman says, and 
how she says it. In fact, perhaps given the current climate of fundamentalist and 
conservative backlash, the issue of speaking-well as a woman is more in need 
of political examination and treatment than ever before, if we are not to be 
submerged under the heinous violence that women and people who identify as 
othered (to the white patriarchal system) are subject to these days.
 For me, at least, this caused a return to a place where I had once begun: 
the issue of women’s expression, women’s words, women’s voice. How to speak 
as a woman, how to be heard without gendered prejudice. How to say what 
you need to say without being subject to the violence of being called a bitch, a 
witch, told that you will be grabbed by the pussy, and ultimately that you need 
“corrective” raping even though you are too ugly to be rapeable.1 That your very 
words are disgusting, intolerable and you need to be utterly destroyed. 
 Because nowadays it seems that it is allowed, even encouraged, to speak 
to women and others in this way. We have enough great examples before our 
very eyes every day. And that this behaviour exists is of profound concern: for 
what does it say about the people who are behaving, writing, and speaking this 
way?2  
 In a cultural climate that allows this level of (verbal) violence without 
impunity, and with a certain political (and definitely gendered) immunity, it is my 
belief that we don’t have to “be nice” anymore.
 We must, however, examine what an other of “being nice” actually is. 
 Because to fight violence with violence just degrades the whole issue, 
and we are better than that and we want better than that. We want actual and 
profound change; an absolute difference.
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Anger is an energy: ever onwards to a feminist praxis and ethics
 
Well, they better watch out. This might just be a case of boys being 
boys. But pushing back against that bullshit? That’s rapidly starting 
to become a case of girls being girls. And this time, there really isn’t 
a damn thing anyone can do to stop that. (Ford 2016)
Once upon a time there was an essentialist demand placed on women; we were 
more “emotional”, more “sensitive”, more “caring”, “nurturing” and just generally 
the “soft” sex. These traits were assigned to us, biologically. And should we 
depart from them in any way, we were judged as “unnatural” and therefore fit 
only for the mental asylum and/or serious “psychiatric intervention” such as 
electro-shock therapy and toxic psychopharmacological medication.3 We had to 
be isolated because our biology had somehow gone awry. 
 Gradually, however—and in no small part due to our feminist foremothers—
this myth has been exploded, and the radical idea that women have feelings that 
are most definitely not “nice” is taking ground.
 But the hangover of biological essentialism still lingers. 
 It lingers on the way women (and others) are being spoken about by the 
hegemonic institutions that are still in place. 
 Women—again, in no small part due to the work that has come before us—
are no longer “soft” enough to accept being spoken about in this way, and the 
excuse that “boys will be boys” is no longer convincing.
 To be thus disrespected is beginning to make us openly angry, an affect 
that has been well hidden in the essentialist schema of “what a woman is”. But 
it has been so well suppressed (although women always have been angry), that 
no-one knows what to do with women’s anger. 
 They never have. 
 “Feminine” anger comes in relation to the constructed imperative and 
demand to “be nice”.
 Women are not “supposed” to be angry, and if they are, they are to hide it 
well, perhaps take it to a psychologist, medicate it out of existence. There is no 
reason for a woman to be angry—if she is the well acted-out object that her very 
existence depends upon—and if she is angry, she is sick.4 
 This is not new. This is an old, old story. 
 We need to re-examine what anger is, in context of feminist practice and 
feminist epistemology. We need to see what to do with our anger, because now 
more than ever we have something to be so very angry about. We need to see if 
we can make our anger work for us, instead of immersing in it, or of ignoring it 
and hoping that by being nice about things, we can diffuse the bullies and make 
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them go away. (Neither strategies have, in my experience, actually made any 
absolute difference whatsoever.) 
 This is a matter of jouissance, and specifically, what Lacan calls “feminine 
jouissance” (Lacan 1972-1973).
 We have not heard, really, of feminine jouissance since the so-called 
“French post-modern feminists”. Which is a great pity, because now more than 
ever we can use the concept of feminine jouissance to critique our reaction to 
the conservative patriarchal backlash of the current political climate, and to 
position ourselves in response to our own political/personal feminist practice. 
And to hold in mind that the world that we are currently residing in is termed a 
“post-truth”, “alternative fact” world.5
Won’t make love to change your mind, no hippy chick6
I am going to back-track somewhat now, because we do not live in a vacuum 
and there is always a historical context to what and where we are today, and 
what perhaps we can take from those who have gone before us. Feminism these 
days seems to have fallen into the twenty-first century heap that is defined 
by globalism, technology and hyper-capitalism. Some of the worst things that 
are going on today, and which are so very very loud, are rooted in some of the 
hopes and dreams that our reasonably recent past held.
 I am referring specifically to the technology of media and social media, 
which seems to be an imperative involved in almost all discussion and debate 
in contemporary life. I remember when (yes, I am that old!) the internet was 
intended as a radical site away from conservative and hegemonic cultural or 
economic discourse, intended as a platform of free speech and equality—those 
libertarian baby boomer hippy utopian ideals.7 So much has changed; but what is 
in place in the hic et nunc, the here and now? What ever happened to feminism?
 Early, more utopian, technological progress has given us a platform; 
we can at least take that from our recent-ancient history. The globalisation of 
media technology allows us space to say what we have to say, to publicise our 
agendas, to inform and educate, and to be seen in a way that has previously 
been underground, alienated and alienating, secret, hidden, shunned. This, at 
least, is a positive effect of the original ideals of the internet. Those of us who 
before have been marginalised have grown stronger because there is a place 
where our voices are heard and recognized. Social media—which perhaps can be 
intertwined with Bey’s notion of Temporary Autonomous Zones (1990; 1991)8—
have given voice to many previously alienated groups of people who would 
otherwise have had to remain silent. These voices have caused great social and 
political awareness and change.
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 But, sadly, the imaginary aspect of technology—plus its overwhelming 
oversaturation of information uptake—has left an effect and an affect of anxiety. 
There is a dissolution of subjective meaning, and an overabundance of Imaginary 
identifications that are not critiqued or questioned because there is so much 
imperative to be social and socially “aware” that there is no time for pause or 
critical thinking. And there is a rampant and—frankly—weird over-proliferation of 
gendered verbal and physical violence (Jane 2017a & b). I have written elsewhere 
that this seems to me to be an alarming and possibly pathological shift to a 
perverse ideology that affords no difference to others that are not of the same 
psychical (or indeed patriarchal gendered) structure (Thomas 2016). I do not 
want to dwell on this more as it is a complex issue, not unrelated to feminism 
today, but rather it is the terrain in which we as feminists find ourselves. And 
again, I reiterate that this particular cultural iteration does not stand out 
of context to its history. It is just that the contemporary terrain has its own 
imperatives and we are attempting to position ourselves as feminists within this 
terrain, which has its own—in my opinion—perverse ideology and structure.
 With all of the complexities of feminism epistemology over time and 
history, where are we in the ideological perversity of the here and now?
 This question causes its very own jouissance.
Personal/political
  And not to become wiser means to become more ignorant. (Irigaray  
  1994 21) 
The shrinking effect of social media, hyper-capitalism (with its devouring 
marketing-consumption imperative driven identifications) and post-truth 
ideology have reduced feminism to a singular entity “ism”. And, as that great 
absurdist philosopher of the 1980s Ferris Beuller once said, “isms are not good”.9 
And feminism, in particular, was and always will be a complex thing. Feminism 
does stand apart from other “ideologies” because ultimately, feminism does not 
subscribe to a singular idea—apart from the radical idea that women are human 
beings and therefore subject to human rights. Hegemony has difficulty with 
the notion and practice of subjectivity; subjectivity is irreducible to a singular 
definition, it is flexible and malleable, and changes over time with experience. 
Feminism has been described as fluid, because feminism notices the subjectivity 
of each woman and each woman’s circumstances. Hegemony—and especially 
patriarchy—cannot fathom this, to the point of either foreclosure or disavowal, 
because it is itself subject to a specific form of phallic signification which can 
only be encapsulated by a slogan, or a unifying signifier, and at its worst, a 
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perverse and static ideology. Lacan’s description of the positions of male and 
female, masculine and feminine, in his Seminar XX:Encore (1972-1973) speak very 
well to this, and I will be returning to Lacan later on. 
 This problem arises for women—and the feminist movement in particular—
when there is no level playing field for masculine and feminine10 to stand on, 
and only one rule of the game; fight dirty, destroy with extreme prejudice. Boys 
will be boys, and will fight like boys, but do girls need to fight back like boys, or 
is there a way for girls to be girls (and remember, “studies” have consistently 
shown that girls are “verbal”)? Boys have taken to an extremely violent position 
towards girls—or at least, this violent position is finally being seen clearly, and 
questioned for being the status quo. Girls, however, are no longer happy to 
sit back, shut up, and take it for Queen and Country (or whatever), girls have 
stopped “being nice”. Girls are angry, and girls are pushing back, but it is a 
different action. It is not on the same dirty level as violent little boys.11
 Feminism has above all always identified and practiced as a unique 
integration between subject and principle; the personal is political, and this is 
problematic for a hegemony where a slogan, a “principle” and an ideology are 
identified with more so than human subjects, human relationships, and human 
subjectivity.12 
 Looking back on Carol Hanisch’s 1969 article “The Personal is Political”, 
I can see many points she outlined that are still relevant and up for question 
today, forty-eight years later. Hanisch defines politics as power relationships, 
and describes the problematic of “the system” which uses its power to oppress 
women.13 She encapsulates a shift for women, a shift that involves not giving in 
to the signifiers for femaleness that the “system” hands us; “women are messed 
over, not messed up” (Hanisch 2006 [1969] 3). Describing the “consciousness 
raising” meetings that were part of the work early feminists were undertaking, 
she says that the findings and experiences of these groups show that “One of 
the first things we discover is that personal problems are political problems” 
(Hanisch 2006[1969] 4). The principle of feminism is that women’s very lives 
are politicized in that the power relations of “the system” render women’s lives 
as demeaned, secondary, and if women are unhappy about this they are unwell. 
And on top of that, all alternatives for living are “bad” under the contemporary 
conditions; all possible ways of political definition are negative. Hanisch 
describes that in such a climate, action and theory need to be positioned 
together:
This is part of one of the most important theories we are beginning 
to articulate. We call it “the pro-woman line.” What is says basically 
is that women are really neat people. The bad things that are said 
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about us as women are either myths (women are stupid), tactics 
women use to struggle individually (women are bitches), or are 
actually things that we want to carry into the new society and want 
men to share too (women are sensitive, emotional). Women as 
oppressed people act out of necessity (act dumb in the presence 
of men), not out of choice. Women have developed great shuffling 
techniques for their own survival (look pretty and giggle to get or 
keep a job or a man) which should be used when necessary until 
such time as the power of unity can take its place. Women are 
smart not to struggle alone (as are blacks and workers [and LGBTQI 
people]). It is no worse to be in the home than in the rat race of the 
job world. They are both bad. Women, like blacks, workers, [LGBTQI 
people], must stop blaming ourselves for our “failures.” (Hanisch 
2006[1969] 4 [my additions])
Hanisch describes the difficulty in attempting action without some sort of 
underpinning theory to support the action, wherein which action fails into 
a messy, chaotic acting out, women “screaming for action without theory” 
(Hanisch 2006[1969] 5). This kind of knee-jerk reaction without thought behind 
it devolves the position of feminism and feminists, according to Hanisch, and we 
will bear this thought in mind, especially in context of the emerging difference 
between hegemonic (perverse) ideology, that is, static phallogocentrism, and a 
fluid discourse of subjectivity. I suspect that Hanisch’s article becomes a seed for 
further feminists to germinate, and I believe that these are ideas that are still in 
question for feminists to this day. 
 Here is a seed:  “Maybe the answer is not to put down the method of 
analysing from personal experiences in favour of immediate action, but to figure 
out what can be done to make it work” (Hanish 2006[1969] 5 [my emphasis]).
Sticks and stones may break my bones…
How do we analyse? We have a body of information, a question about it, and 
we talk about it. We are taught to (first) engage in the Hegelian action of 
thesis-antithesis-synthesis. But what do we use in this action other than words? 
Speech?
Psychoanalysis itself has its efficacy in what is known as “the talking cure”.14 
(Psychology and psychiatry follow, albeit in very different ways.) Words can and 
do have a very physical effect on the human being, and are not to be dismissed 
at the mercy of sticks and stones; which is why psychological abuse is of as 
great a concern as physical and sexual abuse, and should be paid more attention 
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to by the patriarchal hegemony.
 Psychoanalysis has from the outset been concerned with “the woman 
question”, as it is psychoanalysis that first took the female hysteric seriously, as a 
subject. Charcot’s treatment of his female subjects put them on show as objects 
of scientific oddity and study, he made an experimental scientific-theatre from 
them. Freud—who, to be fair, only studied with Charcot for five months or so—
found something else in the hysteric’s words. For Freud noticed that the hysteric 
patients he worked with—mostly women who wouldn’t shut up and were 
“difficult”—were speaking about something which the words they were afforded 
could not adequately encompass. Freud followed them and noted that the 
associations these women were making lead to a unique direction for each of 
them; into their unconscious repressions, which were on the whole sexual desires 
that were not allowed to be voiced, let alone acted on.15 It was the words of the 
female subjects of Freud that allowed the unconscious to be discovered, the 
words that Freud did not dismiss as irritating or trivial “woman’s talk”, but rather 
that he found a way to listen to, to make an effective “cure” for his patients.
 Something about the way the hysterics spoke—and were listened to—freed 
them up from the attachment and return to the places of anxiety or depression 
or frustration or “overly-inclusive” babbling.
 It is a testament to Freud’s work and practice that he never demeaned 
or trivialised his patients, even though as a researcher he might have stumbled 
along the way from time to time (frankly, who doesn’t?). Freud himself dwelt 
for a very long time on feminine sexuality, and for him it was something of a 
mysterious “dark continent”.16 His famous question, what does a woman want?17 
speaks to his inability to “plug the hole” of this particular question, which we 
can perhaps perceive as Freud’s own subjective question. Whether or not 
Freud found an answer for himself to this question is not within the scope of 
our speculations. What we are concerned with is how this question comes into 
play in the terrain of the contemporary domain within which we are positioning 
feminism and feminist activity. Our question is a direct descendent of Freud’s, 
but we are coming at it as women.
 A great many feminists have been anti-Freud, stating that Freud’s 
conceptualization of women comes from the hegemonic patriarchal phallic 
position. That psychoanalysis positions women as “the other”—to what? To 
men, who have the phallus. That having the phallus is the one trait that defines 
the “norm” of the hegemony.  Since Freud did, indeed, investigate the line that 
the little boy has something the little girl does not, and that the little girl wants 
it, it is easy to see how some feminist developments can fall into the trap of 
automatically placing Freud into the place of an essentialist whose allegiance 
firmly grasps the phallic signifier and waves it in the face of those of us who go 
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without. It appears as a taunt by the bully who has been told that he is the little 
prince, because “he’s the man”. 
 This is one version that arouses feminist anger.  And perhaps, on a certain 
level, we can say, rightly so. It is never pleasant to be continuously reminded of 
our failings, that which we don’t have and can never attain, making us somewhat 
lesser to those that appear to have it. It is never pleasant to be constantly told 
there’s something wrong with us because we can never have what the other one 
does, no matter how hard we try.
 But we get stuck here. It is a ditch out of which we can never crawl. And 
that is not the point, I think, of feminism today.
 Perhaps when Freud asks—and to me it is with that tinge of sadness—what 
does a woman want? we need to let go a little of the notions of what is means to 
have and not to have. There is a very large and glaring assumption being made 
here about this binary opposition, “whole” and “hole”, which is not unrelated to 
the imaginary position of essentialism. Freud had not yet come to the position 
that Lacan will later develop, in his own return to what Freud said. There is 
more to come. Feminist enquiry cannot and may not stop at the limit that Freud 
apparently comes to (after all, one can only live so long and research so far. 
Freud caused a revolution in his discovery of the unconscious.) It is, I repeat, a 
sticking place that is tempting to rest at, but we must not stay there, for reasons 
not only of progress, but our own personal/political sanity and stability.
 I will return now to Hanisch and the notion that the personal is political, 
and to insert the notion of talking as a radical act of change (as did Freud). 
Hanisch finds a complexity in the consciousness raising groups which I think is 
pertinent to the idea of talk as change. She writes that the groups have been 
criticised as “therapy” sessions, and personal ones at that. Therapy, of course, 
indicates that there is something wrong, a dis-ease, a divergence from the norm 
that needs to be rectified. It indicates a certain standard of hegemonic mental 
hygiene that does not take the subject into account. In the context of feminism, 
she writes, this criticism comes because “woman’s personal talk” is “not political 
enough”. 
 And here we have the direct example of the patriarchal hegemony as the 
“norm” from which all divergences are abnormal, as in some feminist criticism of 
Freud. 
 But Hanisch asks a different question which I believe is as alive and as 
radical today as it was in 1969:
 This is not to deny that these sessions have at least two aspects 
that are therapeutic. I prefer to call this aspect “political therapy” 
as opposed to personal therapy. The most important is getting 
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rid of self-blame. Can you imagine what would happen if women, 
blacks, [LGBTQI people] and workers (my definition of worker is 
anyone who has to work for a living as opposed to those that don’t. 
All women are workers) would stop blaming ourselves for our sad 
situation? It seems to me that the whole country needs that kind of 
political therapy. (Hanish 2006[1969] 4, my addition)
The “sad situation” comes when those who have-not (women who do not have 
the phallus) compare themselves to those who have (men who “do have” the 
phallus). The “sad situation” also comes when having the phallus is what is 
culturally hegemonic for both “females” and “males”. And whilst I re-iterate that 
the “therapeutic” is in place when there is a perception that there is something 
“wrong” with the subject when placed up to the “norm” of hegemony. Hanisch 
shifts the perspective, shifts the ground, repositions the terrain. She holds up the 
hegemony and says, “this needs political therapy”: or, an absolute difference to 
the power differential.
 For Hanisch, the “political” hegemony is not working. For us, we can do 
something with Freud’s question, what does a woman want?. 
We can look at it from another perspective, one that stands in a different 
position to that of the phallic signifier of having. (After all, haven’t we come to 
the populist conclusion in the hic et nunc, that women can’t have it all?)
Girls talk/And they want to know how girls talk/And they say it’s not 
allowed, girls talk/And they think they know how girls talk18
  “What would happen if one woman told the truth about her life?   
  “The world would split open.” (Rukeyser 1968)
So what has been done in the meantime, between the then of the foremothers 
and the now? What does it mean to be a feminist today?
 I am a femininst scholar, I am also a Lacanian psychoanalyst. This is not 
by chance, because Lacan tells us that “the unconscious is structured like a 
language.”19 My original interest and investment in feminism stems from the 
tense problematic that showed itself to me quite early on in life of feminine 
speech. My interest in Lacanian psychoanalysis only serves to extend the 
question of speech, and what Lacan identifies as an ethics of speaking well.20 As 
a psychoanalyst, my work is not anchored in social theory or any universalising 
empirical confirmation of sociology. This does not intersect with the Discourse of 
the Master21, but I do believe it has connections with the terrain of feminisms, and 
the issue of female speaking. I am more interested in the subjective unconscious, 
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and how the subject may or may not come to terms with the contemporary 
world of signifiers and significations that we are all living in. The early feminist 
agenda and practice of “consciousness raising” in groups is not psychoanalysis, 
but it is a way of working that stands, perhaps, a little aside from the Discourse 
of the Master, and the hegemony. This practice is designed, it seems to me, to 
allow room for feminine speech and to attempt to “figure out what can be done 
to make it work”; not unlike the space of the analytical couch, where what is 
worked on is the creation of an absolute difference.22
 But the female speech I am interested in still has not yet left its safe space. 
It still stands apart from the places of hegemonic discourse, it is still “othered”. 
Women who speak (even within the norms of polite and academic discourse) in 
the hegemonic discourse of the internet are met with the most violent forms of 
threat imaginable (Ford 2016b; Jane 2017a), and to reiterate; whilst the immature 
response to the outrage of this language is that “it’s just words”, “it’s just a joke”, 
words have a very real effect. 
 I do not want to dwell in great length on female speech and female 
writing, but I have to point out that female speech, écriture féminine was an 
attempt to create some version of “an ethics of speaking-well” that stands 
outside the hegemonic patriarchy. Felski wrote of this form:
The notion of a purely “feminine” writing is defended as a utopian 
moment within feminism by several commentators: l’écriture 
feminine is to be understood as a liberating form of writing which 
cannot as yet be even fully imagined. It may well be the case that 
a utopian perspective constitutes a necessary inspiratory vision for 
feminism as an oppositional ideology (Felski 1989 42). 
Feminine speech—and by extension feminine writing—is meant to be a “wild 
zone”.23 A space opens up, or is consciously created, for a voice to emerge. 
There are two problematics, however, that arise: first, is this “wild” voice of the 
singular subjective unconscious, or is it of a political order, the voice of a group? 
Is it an intersection of the two, the personal which is the political? A question of 
how the politics effects the subject in the Real, or otherwise?
 Second, what is this voice representative of? The Hegemonic Other, who 
could very well be situated in a static perverse ideology, or the discourse of 
speaking-well, subjectively? This tension is a very real one for feminists; it cuts 
to the very kernel of the feminist agenda, how to be radically different from the 
hegemony that is oppressive and alienating. It is the difference between fighting 
like a boy—and getting stuck in the mire of that battle to the death—and Ford’s 
notion of “fighting like a girl” (Ford 2016b).
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 To an extent, feminists who have engaged with what female speech and 
female writing means have been examining this idea of what it means to have 
a form and place that is “woman”. And that is not othered or alienated, a form 
and a place that is safe to be a woman in. Spender writes: “While the male-as-
norm syndrome persists, women have a structured problem […] If and when 
sufficient women agree that they no longer subscribe to the rules and patterns 
of patriarchy, then the rules and patterns are likely to be transformed” (Spender 
1998[1980] 2-3). This is a critical mass approach, but the question remains: how 
do we achieve a critical mass?
Everything will be changed once woman gives woman to the other 
woman. (Cixous 1976 881)
Female jouissance is situated in a place that has nothing to do with patriarchal 
hegemony, and has—up until French post-modern feminism—always had the 
smear of mental illness associated with it. This smear sticks still, given the way 
woman are still spoken about from popular media to personal encounters, 
and the odd, new (but not new) discussion surfacing on the way women’s 
speech is interrupted by men.24 Women’s very speech is seen as jouissance, 
mad, disturbing and better off left unsaid. A woman who speaks is out of (the 
hegemonic) place.25 Irigaray and Cixous are two writers of and for female speech 
who are informed by Lacan’s work, especially with regard to the question of 
female jouissance. 
 Cixous’s and Irigaray’s work focus on repositioning feminine jouissance, 
and working to liberate it from the negative connotation that is has when placed 
in the context of patriarchal hegemony and its institutions. Cixous states:
When I say “woman,” I’m speaking of woman in her inevitable 
struggle against conventional man; and of a universal woman subject 
who must bring women to their senses […] But first it must be said 
that in spite of the enormity of the repression that has kept them in 
the “dark”—that dark which people have been trying to make them 
accept as their attribute—there is, at this time, no general woman, 
no one typical woman […] you can’t talk about a female sexuality, 
uniform, homogenous, classifiable into codes—any more than you 
can talk about one unconscious resembling another. Women’s 
imaginary is inexhaustible […] (Cixous 1976 875-76)
Irigaray posits a description of female jouissance in a very vivid manner:
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Man is separated from that primary space which, it appears, is 
everything to him. He lives out a kind of exile between the never 
more and the not yet. Woman can occupy the place of the spatial. 
She is assisted in this role by her relation to the cyclical. But not in 
the traditional act of love (in which, notably, she has no access to 
language as temporal scansion). Even if she extends indefinitely into 
space, and thereby risks losing time […] this is because her sexuality 
does not have to obey the imperatives and risks of erection and 
detumescence. In some sense her jouissance is a result of indefinite 
touching. The thresholds do not necessarily mark a limit, the end 
of an act. She can take part in the man’s act, or even produce it, 
without ever achieving her own act. In the act of love, she finds 
herself more or less expanded, more or less deeply touched, more 
or less unfolded in her desire of the moment. Time is not measured 
in the same way for her as for man. A sentence without a period? A 
musical phrase that would never end? An expanse extending on and 
on forever. A horizon forever open, closed up only with difficulty, as 
a result of that other punctuation or rhythm. (Irigaray 1994 64-65)
Both Cixous and Irigaray read Lacan’s treatment of feminine jouissance as 
negative, lacking, and firmly in the place of the bearer of the phallus taunting 
the one who lacks, thus oppressing her. The bearer of the phallus shows her up 
for her lack, and denigrates her for always wanting more, more, more. This is a 
jouissance of greed, and this is what tends towards the pathological—to never 
be content, and to never desire to break away from the jouissance of the hungry 
demand, more! to “be sensible”. Irigaray states: “She always wants more, encore, 
we are told by certain psychoanalysts (Jacques Lacan in particular) who equate 
this more with pathology. In fact, the more is the condition of sexuate female 
desire. Impossible, no doubt, to satisfy in everyday life. But not pathological for 
all that” (Irigaray 1994 64).
 Cixous, too, comments on Lacan’s grip on the phallus:
[…] Lacan preserves it in the sanctuary of the phallos (φ) “sheltered” 
from castration’s lack!26 Their “symbolic” exists, it holds power—we, 
the sowers of disorder, know it only too well. But we are in no way 
obliged to deposit our lives in their banks of lack, to consider the 
constitution of the subject in terms of a drama manglingly restaged, 
to reinstate again the religion of the father. (Cixous 1976 884)
For Cixous and Irigaray, feminine jouissance becomes the very thing that 
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plugs the hole of lack. It is this jouissance that places women out of the phallic 
hegemony, and into the space of feminine speech; the jouissance makes the 
speech. This speech, this writing, will recoup the feminine to the woman, 
bring her back herself, and reclaim that “irrational” and “mad” configuration, 
and restore her to herself. In this way feminine jouissance can be put to work, 
according to both Cixous and Irigaray, create something entirely new and radical, 
even if it does transgress the signifiers and tropes of patriarchal institutions.
 But that is the agenda of this type of work, and for our purposes, is not 
even a difficult or negative one.
 Feminine jouissance becomes the thing that fills the woman, gives her 
a sense of herself, and shows that the lack given to us by the phallogocentric 
symbolic order is being actively refuted and refused. Cixous calls for “[…] the 
woman who would hold out against oppression and constitute herself as a 
superb, equal, hence ‘impossible’ subject, untenable in a real social framework” 
(Cixous 1976 879). 
 It is without doubt that both Irigaray and Cixous treat feminine jouissance 
in a way that recovers it from a negative connotation, a pathologizing effect 
that has caused a great deal of trauma and anger through many ages. They 
suggest an agenda to work with: writing, speaking, the recognition of patriarchal 
universalizing signifiers of women and utilizing them as transgressive acts. 
“Woman must put herself into the text—as into the world and into history—by 
her own movement” (Cixous 1976 875).
 In a sense this is echoed by Spender as well:
Woman talk which has been disallowed and disavowed by the 
patriarchal order is one of the most powerful means of subverting 
and transforming that order. Because of this, the dominant group 
can be relied upon to hinder the growth and development of woman 
talk. I think women should resist these pressures to the utmost and 
that patriarchal myth should be made feminist reality. Women should 
become the talkative sex. (Spender 1998[1980] 137)
Irigaray gives us a beautiful example of female speech that is not burdened by 
patriarchal dismissal—perhaps inspired by Lacan’s Seminar VIII:Transference 
(1960-1961)—via Plato’s Symposium, and the story of Diotima’s teachings. In 
The Symposium (1999), Socrates, who is held up as the arbiter of knowledge of 
love and who is the hero of this story, speaks about his own education. He has 
been taught by a woman, Diotima. Diotima is a sort of wise woman—perhaps a 
priestess of some mysteries—and she has taught him the ways of love. Diotima 
does not speak for herself in The Symposium, though. Socrates speaks for her.
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 I will not repeat what Diotima teaches Socrates, rather I would prefer to 
dwell on how she speaks, which is where Irigaray’s example proves very useful 
for us. The Symposium itself is in a form of literary expression that is dialogic. 
For us it could read as a script. It is set at a (boy’s only) party where the express 
purpose of the evening is drinking and speaking. Tonight’s topic is love, and each 
participant speaks of what he knows about love and how he knows it. Socrates 
is the man of the hour, a much beloved man who points out flaws in everyone’s 
theory. But when he is asked what he knows of love and how he knows it, 
he defers to his teacher, Diotima, a woman. Here is what Irigaray says about 
Diotima’s way of speaking:
 Diotima’s teaching will be very dialectical, but different from what 
we usually call dialectical. In effect, it doesn’t use opposition to make 
the first term pass into the second in order to achieve a synthesis 
of the two, as Hegel does. From the outset, she established an 
intermediary that will never be abandoned as means or a path. 
Her method, then, is not a propaedeutic of the destruction or the 
destructuration of two terms in order to establish a synthesis that 
is neither one nor the other. She presents, uncovers, unveils the 
insistence of a third term that is already there and that permits 
progression: from poverty to wealth, from ignorance to wisdom, 
from mortality to immortality. Which, for her, always comes to a 
greater perfection of and in love.
 But, contrary to the usual methods of dialectic, one should 
not have to give up love in order to become wise or learned. It is 
love that leads to knowledge, whether in art or more metaphysical 
learning. It is love that both leads the way and is the path. A 
mediator par excellence. (Irigaray 1994 20-21)
Irigaray posits that Diotima does something different to the destructive 
method of thesis-antithesis-synthesis; her dialectic produces something rather 
than diffusing it. This, then, allows growth, something new to emerge and 
keep circulating. This reminds me very much of the “old-fashioned” notion 
of consciousness raising groups, whose imperative is to “figure out what to 
do”, much as in the same way the “absolute difference” of “speaking-well” in 
Lacanian psychoanalysis aims for the same production. 
 And I think it now useful to recast the “problematic” of feminine speech 
in this aspect: to call up the function of production via dialectic rather than 
destruction-diffusion via synthesis. Irigaray writes further:
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 Diotima’s dialectic is in an at least four terms: the here, the two poles 
of the encounter, and the beyond—but a beyond that never abolishes 
the here. And so on, indefinitely. The mediator is never abolished in 
an infallible knowledge. Everything is always in movement, in a state 
of becoming. And the mediator of all this is, among other things, or 
exemplarily, love. Never fulfilled, always becoming […] Thus [Diotima] 
ceaselessly examines Socrates on his positions without positing 
authoritative, already constituted truths. Instead, she teaches the 
renunciation of already established truths. And each time Socrates 
thinks he can take something as certain, she undoes his certainty. 
(Irigaray 1994 21-22 [my emphasis])
The undoing of certainty evokes the rigid difference of a static perverse 
ideology that must be questioned by a dialectical discourse, via movement and 
production rather than enunciated demand and destruction. 
 Lacan even gives this schema and ascribes the movement within discourse 
certain functions:
(Lacan 1972b 17)
The function of a discourse is to produce something. The discourse itself has 
an internal movement, starting from the lower left hand corner and progressing 
clock-wise to the lower right hand corner. (The are certain terms in Lacan’s 
discourses which are placed in the schema and then moved to form different 
discourses, but the best readings of these can be found in Lacan’s Seminar 
XVII:The Other Side of Psychoanalysis and Seminar XX:Encore.)
 Cixous and Irigaray find a different way of speaking for women. Utilizing 
what was previously perceived as the dregs of speech by an ideologically 
driven hegemony—women’s crazy babble—they take what has been deemed 
pathological and give it a space apart from, away from its persecutors. Women’s 
jouissance filled words are creative, they can do something in the world, produce 
a discourse that is at once mediated by love (rather than destruction) and 
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grapples with (hegemonic) certainties to de-stabilize the painful and oppressive 
status quo. 
 Irigaray states that “[a] non-traditional, fecund encounter between the 
sexes barely exists” (Irigaray 1994 9). Is it possible that this formulation—if 
it is possible that this formulation can ever be liberated from its radical and 
transgressive position—could produce a change?
Creation ex nihilo: the big bang, the black hole, the dark continent
There are limitations to the beautiful, tempting, utopian ideas of feminine 
jouissance. 
 It does not admit to lack, and when there is no lack, there is anxiety. 
Lacan describes this phenomenon very well in Seminar X:Anxiety. Felski, who 
we have seen laud feminine writing as an inspiring and visionary act, also warns 
that it is an impossible agenda.27 For, really, how can we speak or write when 
our very words are the signifiers given to us by the Symbolic Order—which we 
are born into whether we like it or not—and therefore subject to the hegemonic 
patriarchal order? How can we speak without using those words, or it this an 
impossibility? If so, then what?
 Cixous and Irigaray, who do fault Lacan as the one who uses the phallus 
and the phallic order to oppress the female jouissance and stuff it into the box 
of pathology, also do not follow the observation that anxiety comes when there 
is too much jouissance, as in their schema of never-ending utopian feminine 
jouissance where there is no encounter with the phallus as positioned as 
oppressive. Cixous goes so far as to accuse Lacan of saying that the phallus is 
sheltered from castration’s lack (Cixous 1976 884). 
 And it is here that I must part with my two favourite foremothers in their 
utopian dream of creating a pure zone of feminine jouissance. For this cannot 
hold in the world we are necessarily born into, and have to navigate through, 
whether we like it or not. After a great deal of scholarship dwelling in the wild 
zone, I was left with the sense that this wild zone was a nice place to visit, but 
impossible to inhabit. I also was craving to learn exactly “what Lacan said.” For 
there is something too frantic in Cixous’s and Irigaray’s fantasy of eradicating 
lack, something that runs too close to anxiety (which always indicates the 
opposite of lack, the opposite of desire).
 So let us try to make a précis of what Lacan said, because the study 
of Lacan is no short thing. Lacan defies a definition of easy epistemological 
uptake. You can read and then reread Lacan and the text will change with each 
reading. You find more, you find something else. Because Lacan’s work is a 
praxis, and not an ideology. Lacan’s work does not remain static, because his 
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pedagogical value is not on the level of aphorisms, definitions, or rote learnings 
of “standards”. And you certainly can’t grasp it after one read only.
 I think there is a great deal of value in exploring the process of the study 
of Lacan’s work, it is as complex as one’s own psychoanalysis. It is a work-in-
progress and it speaks to the subjectivity of each unconscious that approaches 
this type of work. So—to cut things short—Lacan’s work ought never be taken 
as a canon for the masses. Here there is no empirical evidence but that of one’s 
own observations. 
 Something, I believe, that feminism would do well to re-examine given 
that we are face-to-face with a patriarchal hegemony that is getting more and 
more perverse by the minute.28 In fact, it is my belief that feminism should cease 
thinking of itself as an ideology and begin to explore itself as a discourse. 
Therein lies at least one difference that feminism can utilize as a radical 
difference to the ideology of patriarchal hegemony.
Encore: anger is an energy29
If there is some angle from which this business of the sexual 
relationship could be clarified, it’s precisely from the ladies’ side 
(côté), insofar as it is on the basis of the elaboration of the not-
whole that one must break new ground. (Lacan 1973 57) 
The biggest secret that no-one mentions about the phallus is that it is a mirage 
utilized to cover up lack.
 NO-ONE “has” it.30 
 We only pretend to have it—in one form or another, males make use of 
it in different ways to females, and with different psychic structures all sorts of 
things go on in the covering over of lack. We all lack, and the ones who shout 
the loudest about how they don’t, actually do lack the most. We all lack, and this 
is the hardest thing about human existence that is to be faced. 
 This is what, sadly, feminism has forgotten, or ignored; that by the virtue 
of our very existence, we lack. Yes, we are all subject to the perverse ideology of 
patriarchal hegemony, this—unfortunately—is the world we are currently born in 
to. 
 BUT: must we by virtue of being born at all ingest this ideology? Must 
we take it on board? Must we be stuffed silent by the phallus, forced down our 
throats? Must our lack, our desire, be plugged with the phallus-fetish that is too 
full of jouissance, and thus anxiety?
 I am in no way, shape or form suggesting that we re-subscribe to a 
feminist utopia. We must rid ourselves of the idea that any utopia can exist. 
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Let us leave utopia firmly in the realm of fantasy, lovely to think about, but 
impossible to create, let alone sustain. 
 I am suggesting that we move our position in relation to the phallus.
 It actually isn’t real.
 Lacan describes two forms of jouissance: that of the phallus, which is 
simple, and feminine jouissance.
 Feminine jouissance stands outside the phallic order. This is what Lacan 
has described:
There is a jouissance, since I am confining myself here to jouissance, 
a jouissance of the body that is, if I may express myself thus […] 
“beyond the phallus.” That would be cute, huh? And it would 
give another consistency to the women’s liberation movement. A 
jouissance beyond the phallus […] now and then, there is something 
that, for a brief moment, shakes (secoue) women up or rescues them 
(secourt). (Lacan 1973c 74)
This is a jouissance beyond the phallus (Lacan 1973c 74), and it is entirely on the 
side of the female subject because it is a jouissance that has absolutely nothing 
to do with the phallus or its jouissance.
 The paradox of feminine jouissance, though, lies in its lack, or, as Lacan 
puts it, the not-whole of the woman. (And this is why he goes on to say that 
there is no such thing as a universal Woman as there is a universal Man, subject 
as he is to phallic order. Lacan adopts the neologism woman when speaking of 
the divided subject of not-wholeness.) To explain via a metaphor, Lacan says 
this:
When Achilles has taken his step, gotten it on with Briseis, the latter, 
[…] has advanced a bit, because she is “not whole,” not wholly his. 
Some remains […] Here then is the statement (le dit) of the status 
of jouissance insofar as it is sexual. For one pole, jouissance is 
marked by the hole that leaves it no other path than that of phallic 
jouissance. For the other pole, can something be attained that would 
tell us how that which up until now has only been a fault (faille) or 
gap in jouissance could be realized? (Lacan 1972a 8)
And that is why the patriarchal hegemony has such a hard time with it; it simply 
is unequipped to understand this. But that is no excuse for feminists and women 
to submit to what the phallic order tells them in the attempt to disavow feminine 
jouissance.31 
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 Feminine jouissance—that little of nothing, not-wholeness that marks 
us as different to the phallic order, the mirage of having it—has been much 
maligned. It is what has sent untold millions of women either to the stake or to 
the madhouse, or numbed by consumable goods and psychotropic medications. 
It is undefinable and hard to pin down, but there is one signifier that I should like 
to give it, because it is a signifier that has been inadequately treated so far:
women’s anger. 
 Feminisms have made incredible social progress in the way women (and 
others) are able to recognize and speak out against violence and oppression—
and this is where the personal becomes political, because personal violence 
visited upon singular subjects en masse becomes a political issue. Women are 
speaking out in ways that have traditionally been silenced. But there is currently 
an enormous backlash against the momentum of women’s voices, and women 
are no longer content to return to silence. We have given up “being nice”. And 
this is all bound up with women’s anger.
 Anger as a form of feminine jouissance is an important affect to pay 
attention to; we often equate anger with violence. And anger is, indeed, violent 
when there is no adequate signifier to capture the sheer explosive affect without 
words that is the first moment of anger. 
 My hope is that feminism as a praxis, feminism as a discourse, feminism as 
a jouissance that is outside the phallic order, can do something constructive with 
our anger. Let us return to something Lacan says here, which I believe could be a 
tactic that feminism could adopt: creation ex nihilo.
 Feminine jouissance, we know, is predicated on the not-whole of the 
woman. But, as Lacan reminds us, “[n]othing is made from nothing” (Lacan 
1960a 121). He again uses a metaphor that we might find useful, that of the vase 
that surrounds a nothing but still is something:
 Now if you consider the vase from the point of view I first proposed, 
as an object made to represent the existence of the emptiness 
at the centre of the real that is called the Thing, this emptiness 
as represented in the representation presents itself as a nihil, as 
nothing. And that is why the potter, just like you to whom I am 
speaking, creates the vase with his hand around this emptiness, 
creates it, just like the mythical creator, ex nihilo, starting with a hole. 
(Lacan 1960a 121)
 The vase takes shape around emptiness; can it take shape around the 
inarticulable beyond-the-phallus space of feminine jouissance? Can we do 
something profound with our anger?
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 We must. 
 And we must utilize what we have best, our words. We must not stop 
talking. In doing so, we can create a discourse that stands apart from the 
ideological constraints and violence of the hegemonic patriarchy. We can 
produce an absolute difference, and we must.
 THIS is feminist praxis.
 We must not stop talking.
 We must not be afraid of our anger, we must give it shape with our words.
 And we must never be afraid of not being nice.
 Nice has had its day.
 Nasty women, after all, say it very clearly: “you can’t speak for me, thank  
you very much.”
1  Whatever that might mean. This oxymoronic trope very well might be too stupid  
 to keep dwelling on. 
2  I had an enlightening conversation with my 17 year old (step)son. We were talking 
about the taboo on incest, and it was his belief and “education” that the taboo 
against incest is behaviourally and essentially instinctual. I had to explain to him 
that the very existence of the taboo against incest is because of exactly the 
opposite “drive”/instinct. We have the taboo against incest specifically because it 
is our “instinct” to love our primary love objects and that to flourish and function, 
human society/culture developed the taboo against incest and insisted on 
“marrying out”. (Freud, S. (1913) Totem and Taboo: SE XIII 1-162; (1930) Civilization 
and its Discontents: SE XXI 64-145; (1939) Moses and Monotheism: SE XXIII 7-137.) 
If we have no cultural censorship/taboo about the way we speak—as it seems 
now—then why are trolls and political leaders speaking about women the way 
they do? I need not repeat the Australian experience of our first female prime 
minister, Julia Gillard, and they way she was spoken about. If the cultural taboo 
of “respect for women (and others)” is removed, then look at the way women are 
publically sanctioned to be spoken about. It is not a human “instinct” to “be nice 
and respect others.” 
3  Not to mention the practice of surgical cliteridectomy carried out in the 19th   
 century on women in the USA and Europe, to “cure” them of their clitoral   
 orgasms, and by extension, their “masculine tendencies” for sexual enjoyment. 
4  After all, we are told by many that we do not need feminism anymore, that we 
have got “it all”, at least enough to keep us happy and silent, and that we are now 
“equal”. We are told this especially by the women who “have it all”, at least in 
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the material sense. We do not know the quality of their personal and/or psychic 
sense, because the media does not admit to anything it cannot adequately 
twitter on about in sound bites of 25 words or less. And media-generated images 
reside in just that, the Lacanian imaginary. Dwelling exclusively in the imaginary 
sounds somewhat culturally pathological. Kim Kardashian’s media machine has 
touched on the actual Real in recent times, and the Imaginary avatar has faded 
somewhat under the Real of a trauma. 
5  Wikipedia informs me that “post-truth” is the word of the year for 2016, but 
this term was brought to our attention in 2010 by David Roberts (Roberts, D. 
(2010) “Post-truth Politics”, in Grist. http://grist.org/article/2010-03-30-post-
truth-politics/. Accessed 08/01/2017. He writes: “We live in post-truth politics: 
a political culture in which politics (public opinion and media narratives) have 
become almost entirely disconnected from policy (the substance of legislation). 
This obviously dims any hope of reasoned legislative compromise. But in another 
way, it can be seen as liberating. If the political damage of maximal Republican 
opposition is a fixed quantity — if policy is orthogonal to politics — then there is 
little point to policy compromises. They do not appreciably change the politics.” 
6  Soho. “Hippy Chick”. 1991. 
7  See for instance Jane, E. Misogyny Online: A Short (and Brutish) History 2017a; 
Haraway, D. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York: 
Routledge, 1991; Rushkoff, D. Cyberia: Life in the Trenches of Hyper Space. New 
York; HarperCollins, 1994; Wikipedia kindly informs me that this text was held 
back for publication in 1992 “due to publisher concerns that electronic mail and 
the Internet were still obscure topics unlikely to gain traction.” LOLZ. (https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cyberia_(book) accessed 08/01/2017). 
8  Bey, H. “The Temporary Autonomous Zone”. http://nomadism.org/pdf/taz.pdf.   
 Accessed 08/01/2017, 1990; “The Temporary Autonomous Zone”. https://  
 hermetic.com/bey/taz1. Accessed 08/01/2017, 1991. 
9  Is it terribly sad that I still think this is a great concept and that I required my   
 children to watch this movie and think about it? (http://quotegeek.com/quotes- 
 from-movies/ferris-buellers-day-off/227/) 
10  The terms “masculine” and “feminine” are NOT—I repeat NOT—essentialist 
or biological terms, according to Lacan and for our own purposes. They are 
positions that any and each subject must come to terms with. I suspect that 
a very many subjects these days have difficulty with the masculine position 
because it has become to be so very very violent, and many subjects do not 
desire to enter into this violence, or have been subject to it themselves. 
11  I do apologize for the kindergarten metaphors, but it appears that this is the 
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terrain we are stuck with. When my first (female) child was being kicked in a play 
centre by a little boy, I turned to his mother to protest, but she silenced me by 
saying “boys will be boys”, and said nothing to her child. I should have said “boys 
will be wife-bashers” to her, but I was stunned into silence by this Neanderthal 
attitude on behalf of the mother. 
12  Freud, S. Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego: SE XVIII. 67-143. 1921. 
13  Hanisch’s 1969 language is a little retro, I must admit, and we have taken to 
using different words in the 21st century. But I am going to quote Hanisch’s 
words because the gist is the same; we just need to translate the “old-fashioned” 
language into contemporary words. 
14  Breur, J. & Freud, S. Studies on Hysteria: SE II, 1893-1895; Freud, S. Five Lectures 
on Psycho-Analysis: SE XI, 1910[1909]; Doidge, N. The Brain that Changes Itself: 
Stories of Personal Triumph from the Frontiers of Brain Science. 234. New York; 
Viking. 2007; Doidge’s theory—whilst focussing solely in the physiological and 
not taking up the position of the unconscious—posits that due to the brain’s 
plastic nature, non-functioning neuronal pathways can be re-directed, or re-
trained, via a “talking therapy” such as psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Words, in 
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